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The problem of value disagreement and contextualist, relativist and 
metalinguistic attempts of solving it are laid out. Although the metalin-
guistic account seems to be on the right track, it is argued that it does 
not suffi ciently explain why and how disagreements about the meaning 
of evaluative terms are based on and can be decided by appeal to exist-
ing social practices. As a remedy, it is argued that original suggestions 
from Putnam’s “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” ought to be taken seriously. 
The resulting dual aspect theory of meaning can explain value disagree-
ment in much the same way as it deals with disagreement about general 
terms. However, the account goes beyond Putnam’s by not just defend-
ing a version of social externalism, but also defending the thesis that 
the truth conditional meaning of many evaluative terms is not fi xed by 
experts either and instead constantly contested as part of a normal func-
tion of language.
Keywords: Disagreement, meaning vectors, externalism, metalin-
guistic negotiation, truth-conditions.
1. Introduction
Within the recent debate about relativist semantics of evaluative pred-
icates and the corresponding notion of faultless disagreement attention 
has shifted towards more general discussion of value disagreement. 
The problem is how to account for substantive value disagreements 
without degrading them to merely verbal disputes. For it seems that 
if two people disagree about what is good in a given situation, for in-
stance, if they associate different criteria with words like ‘good’ and 
‘better than’ and one of them says ‘Capitalism is good’ and the other 
one replies ‘No, it is not’, then it might appear as if they only disagree 
about the meaning of ‘good’ and in the end only argue about words. In 
reply to this form of relativism, Alexis Burgess, David Plunkett, and 
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Tim Sundell (henceforth abbreviated BPS) have argued in a series of 
articles that such disputes are metalinguistic negotiations about the 
best use of a word in a context but are nevertheless substantial.1
In this article I argue that the metalinguistic negotiation account 
is incomplete. BPS are right that value disagreements can be metalin-
guistic in the sense of being disagreements about the meaning of evalu-
ative expressions. These meanings are not negotiated, though, nor is 
the ‘best use’ of a word negotiated. Rather, value disputes are instances 
of ordinary meaning disputes about general or abstract terms and cor-
responding predicates. If arguments from early semantic externalists 
like Putnam are taken seriously, such disputes are a normal function 
of language and there is no substantial difference between the way 
we disagree about utterances containing the word ‘electron’ and those 
that involve a use of words like ‘good’ and ‘capitalism’. However, Put-
nam’s version of externalism is not directly applicable to value disputes 
because of its strong externalist assumptions. Instead, a dual aspect 
theory of meaning is suggested that only presumes a weak form of se-
mantic externalism for evaluative expressions and remains agnostic 
about the strong externalism thesis for natural kind terms. According 
to my suggestion, speakers often disagree about what an expression 
really means, about what I call its noumenal meaning, on the basis of a 
shared but possibly incomplete core meaning. Only mastery of the core 
meaning is required by virtue of linguistic competence.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2 
contextualist, relativist, and metalinguistic theories of value disagree-
ment are laid out. After a brief critique of the metalinguistic negotia-
tion view I introduce the two aspects of meaning mentioned above and 
show in Section 4 how they explain metalinguistic value disputes. The 
result should be understood as a précis of the approach of BPS and is 
defended against possible objections in Section 5. A short summary is 
given in Section 6.
2. Contextualist and Relativist Disagreement
In this section some forms of disagreement are laid out on the basis of 
distinguishing what two discourse participants disagree about in a tra-
ditional truth-conditional approach: Is it the meaning of words, their 
truth-conditions, or various features of the context and/or the circum-
stances of evaluation of an utterance?
In order to address this question something must be said about 
truth-conditions fi rst. As young Wittgenstein put it: “To understand 
a proposition means to know what is the case, if it is true.” (Tracta-
tus, 4.024)2 In modern versions of truth-conditional semantics it has 
1 See Sundell (2011); Burgess (2013); Burgess and Plunkett (2013); Plunkett and 
Sundell (2013, 2014).
2 Cit. in Wittgenstein (1969).
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become customary to additionally provide a way to deal with indexical 
expressions such as the tenses, and in the philosophy of language two 
main traditions have become prevalent. In a Lewisian account based 
on (Lewis 1980) a sentence φ is true or false in a model relative to a con-
text c and an index i. The context provides a way to fi x the denotation 
of indexicals, whereas the index consists of world-time pairs derived 
from the time and world of the context.3 The purpose of the index in 
this type of theory is purely technical: Expressions like ‘yesterday’ or ‘it 
is possible that’ implicitly quantify over it as part of their meaning. For 
example, ‘it is possible that φ’ is true in c,i if and only if φ is true in c,i’ 
for an index i’ that is the same as i except that the world of i’ is among 
those that are closest to those of i.4 Importantly, the world and time of 
an index is derived in some automatic way from the context.
Kaplan’s two-dimensional semantics is similar to Lewis’s sugges-
tion in many respects.5 The main difference is that Kaplan’s logic is 
weakly intensional and two-layered, thereby introducing the notion of 
the semantic content of an utterance:
linguistic meaning + context  semantic content
semantic content + CEs  extension
Hereby, ‘CEs’ is an abbreviation for circumstances of evaluation, the 
way Kaplan prefers to call the index. In order to avoid confusions with 
more general talk about modal indices by other authors like Cresswell 
(1990, 1996) this abbreviation will be used from now on. Kaplan’s ap-
proach allows for distinctions based on semantic content, which are 
intensions that play the same role as propositions in one-dimensional 
theories, and because of this increased expressivity it will be used as a 
basis of the following considerations unless otherwise noted. However, 
like in Lewis’s approach, CE’s play a merely technical role as a means 
to implicitly quantify over world-time pairs while keeping the interpre-
tation of indexicals rigid. As an example, if Bob says ‘Yesterday, I was 
here’ in Pasadena on 5/23/2016, this is evaluated in such a way that the 
semantic content of ‘I’ is Bob, that of ‘here is Pasadena and the utter-
ance as a whole is true if and only if Bob was at Pasadena on 5/22/2016, 
the day before the the day of the context.
Both theories allow for several distinct types of disagreement, some 
of which are metalinguistic and some of which are content-based. Start-
ing with the latter fi rst, consider the dialogues (1ab) and (1ac):
3 See Lewis (1980: 85–88).
4 In this formulation, Lewis’s neighborhood semantics is assumed. In contrast to 
this, in a normal modal logic the world of i′ must be accessible from the world of i (= 
the world of c, in this case, because there are no nested modal operators) by a dyadic 
accessibility relation. These details make for large technical differences but we can 
ignore them in what follows, since the nature of the respective modalities plays no 
role in the following discussion.
5 See Kaplan (1989). He calls the linguistic meaning of an expression its 
‘character’, but we stick with the term meaning.
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(1) a. Anna: Capitalism is good.
  b. Bob: No, it isn’t.
  c. Bob: No, Democracy is not good.
The idea of direct content-based disagreement is that Anna expresses 
some semantic content φ that Bob denies directly in the sense that 
his reply expresses an ordinary truth-functional negation ¬φ of the 
original content. He makes this explicit in (1–c). Attributing this form 
of disagreement only makes sense when we have reasons to believe 
that Anna’s utterance and Bob’s reply are based on the same linguistic 
meaning and take place within the same context of use, as the example 
suggests. In a Kaplanian framework the semantic content of Bob’s ut-
terance can then be taken as the negation of Anna’s to the effect that 
he directly contradicts her.
Within these theories there are many other forms of disagreement that 
are not discussed in the literature very often. Two agents may disagree 
about empirical facts of the context of use, for example about the ques-
tion who is the speaker or what the time of utterance was. Two agents 
may also disagree about contextual factors that are given by facts but 
rather belong to the cognitive context, to a pragmatic theory of inter-
pretation, and are nevertheless often muddled into the context param-
eter.6 For example, they may disagree about the place denoted by a use 
of ‘here’ in the following utterance:
(2) Anna: It’s cold here.
Is it cold in the bed, cold in the hut, cold in Juneau, Alaska, cold in 
Alaska at this time of the year, cold on this continent as opposed to 
Australia, cold on Earth as opposed to Venus, cold in the Sagittarius 
arm of the Milky Way, cold in this part of the universe, and so forth? 
The indexical can have any of those intended meanings and the dis-
agreement is not semantic in the sense of being disagreement about 
a referent that is provided by linguistically-mandated rules. Instead, 
the disagreement is based on different interpretations when the hearer 
does not take up the speaker’s referential intentions. This pragmatic 
disagreement about the context can occur even if both speakers agree 
on the place of utterance. Note that this type of disagreement can also 
occur in the above example (1), namely about the extension of the pres-
ent tense that is part of the meaning of ‘is’. Anna might want to convey 
that capitalism is good in general (i.e., the generic reading of the pres-
ent tense), but she may also intend to convey the assertion that capital-
ism is good for us now, as opposed to capitalism in Ancient Greece or 
in the near future.
Two agents may also disagree about the question whether a certain 
expression is context-sensitive and about which features of the context 
6 The term cognitive context is borrowed from Penco (1999) who introduces other 
useful distinctions. I have laid out my own view about this type of context at several 
occasions, see e.g. Rast (2009, 2014).
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are relevant for determining its semantic content. For example, Anna 
and Bob may disagree about the question whether the token of ‘here’ in 
(2) denotes the hut, because Anna intended the token to do so, and Bob is 
just wrong about taking it to stand for Alaska, or whether the semantic 
content of (2) is underspecifi ed, and Bob can therefore claim that his in-
terpretation has some legitimacy, since Anna ignored the fact that they 
were just talking about the climate in Alaska when she made the utter-
ance. Whatever stance one takes about their dispute, it is hard to deny 
that their disagreement is metalinguistic. It is also not hard to imag-
ine circumstances under which (1) might constitute a similar dispute if 
‘good’ is context-sensitive as many moral philosophers would claim. For 
example, Anna might argue that she meant ‘Capitalism is good for me’ 
and this is the correct interpretation given that it was her intention to 
convey this message, whereas Bob might argue that ‘good’ principally 
has no genuine relational reading, as Moore (1903) famously claimed.
Relativist positions have been developed as alternatives to the 
classical contextualism outlined above, though within the same truth-
conditional setting, and defended for epistemic modals, future tenses, 
knowledge attributions, aesthetic predicates, predicates of personal 
taste, and evaluative language in general.7 The key difference between 
semantic contextualism and relativism is that in the former any addi-
tional parameters of the CEs are derived from corresponding features 
of the context. MacFarlane (2012) calls a position that puts nontradi-
tional factors into the context and, by some linguistically mandated 
derivation, into the CEs at later stages of evaluation nonindexical con-
textualism. Consider the following utterance, for example:
(3) Bob: Roller coasters are fun.
If the linguistic meaning of ‘fun’ is taken to be context-sensitive to an 
experiencer and this experiencer is determined in the context of use 
such that the semantic content ends up with a specifi cation of this ex-
periencer, then this is a nonindexical contextualist semantics for ‘fun’. 
The representation is semantic, because the additional factor is man-
dated by linguistic meaning and fully specifi ed within a context. It is 
nonindexical, because it need not be claimed that the additional factor 
is determined by the context of use in the narrow sense only. The expe-
riencer need not be the speaker but could rather be determined on the 
basis of the speaker’s intention (e.g. in the reading ‘fun for us’) or by the 
conversational context.8 The representation is contextualist, as long as 
the experiencer is derived or otherwise determined from the context of 
use. Hence, in a two-layered model the semantic content will change 
whenever the respective feature of the context changes.
7 See for instance Kölbel (2002), Lasersohn (2005), MacFarlane (2005, 2014), 
Egan (2014).
8 While there may be concerns about this way of ‘semanticizing’ possibly 
pragmatic interpretation processes, these need not worry us here. It is one possible 
position that may give rise to a particular kind of contextual disagreement.
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In contrast to this, according to assessment-relativism contexts and 
CEs are decoupled from each other, and an additional assessor or rel-
evant features of an assessor such as evaluative standards are taken to 
be a constitutive part of the CEs. This means in the two-layered model 
that one and the same utterance in a given context of use expresses the 
same semantic content, but that the truth or falsity of this content may 
vary from assessor to assessor. So if Anna disagrees with Bob about 
(3) by uttering ‘No, Roller coasters aren’t fun’, this may be taken as a 
case of faultless disagreement. (3) in the context c in which Bob is the 
speaker expresses some semantic content p that leaves the assessor of 
‘fun’ unresolved, i.e., the proposition that roller coasters are fun. This 
content p then comes out true or false in a model relative to the respec-
tive features of the assessor of the CEs. In the example, if the assessor 
is Anna, then it will be false, and if the assessor is Bob, then it will be 
true. Since the assessor is not derived from the context of use, Bob’s 
assessment has no priority over Anna’s. Both are right, each from his 
or her own perspective, and a third-party observer may in turn agree 
with either Bob or Anna.9 So they disagree, as indicated by Anna’s re-
ply, yet both of them may be right. There is leeway for some subtleties 
in the way assessors are assigned to CEs which may have applications 
in moral philosophy. Neither the speaker nor the hearer need to be the 
proper assessors, for instance, they could be ideal observers instead 
and many more refi nements are possible.
3. Pragmatic and Metalinguistic Replies
One criticism of direct disagreement is that it is content-based and that 
disagreement is way more fl exible than that. Two people may also be 
said to disagree if they have differing attitudes towards information 
that is conveyed pragmatically. For example, Lopez de Sá has argued 
that speakers may disagree in a contextualist semantics even if they 
associate different semantic contents with the same utterance, because 
at the same time they might pragmatically convey presuppositions 
of commonality.10 In such a theory, when it is also based on speaker-
conte xtualism, (1–a) could be understood as expressing the proposition 
that democracy is good from the perspective of Anna, whereas (1–c) 
would express the proposition that democracy is not good from the per-
spective of Bob, which is compatible with Anna’s assertion, and they 
might still disagree at a pragmatic level, because each of them presup-
poses something like ‘What is good for me, is (usually) good for every-
one’ and ‘What is not good for me, is (usually) not good for anyone else 
either.’ This peculiar type of contextualism has probably never been de-
fended for goodness in general, but when ‘democracy’ is replaced with 
9 If the lack of a truth value is also allowed, then a third party observer need not 
even agree with any of them.
10 See de Sá (2008, 2009, 2015).
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‘licorice’ the natural reading of ‘good’ in this context may act like a sur-
rogate of ‘tasty’ and for this reading the semantics may not seem less 
plausible than the corresponding relativist position according to which 
the content of Anna’s utterance is ‘Licorice is good’ simpliciter, which 
turns out to be true when assessed by Anna and false when assessed 
by Bob. To cut a long story short, while there may always be a battling 
of intuitions about the question of whether and in which way various 
sorts of expressions and their readings are context-sensitive, de Sá’s 
critique seems justifi ed in general. It seems inadequate to presuppose 
a notion of disagreement that is only defi ned on the basis of what and 
how utterances express semantic content. This critique extends to the 
other content-based notions of disagreement mentioned above, because 
they are based on aspects of the semantic representations rather than 
attitudes of speakers about speech act content or other facts about the 
conversational situation or their own states of beliefs and desires that 
need not be directly connected to semantic representations.
A bigger problem with direct content-based analyses of value dis-
agreement is that they link the expressions to certain metaethical po-
sitions like non-ideal appraiser-subjectivism that may or may not be 
appropriate for a given evaluative predicate. So even if they explain 
value disagreement correctly for certain expressions like predicates of 
personal taste, they may not be adequate for explaining value disagree-
ment in general.
While authors like de Sá have tried to defend their own contextu-
alist positions against relativism, Plunkett and Sundell (2013) have 
argued that many cases of disagreement are metalinguistic, yet can 
be substantive, are worth having, and are not merely verbal disputes. 
A metalinguistic approach is appealing for the analysis of evaluative 
expressions at fi rst sight, because it allows one to explain substan-
tive value disputes without committing to a contextualist or relativist 
semantics. Consider example (1) again. After at least 2,500 years of 
philosophical thinking about goodness, nothing can be said about the 
concept without taking sides, of course, but it is fair to say at least that 
many philosophers are willing to follow von Wright (1963) in his as-
sessment that there are many varieties of goodness and that there is a 
reading of ‘good’ in (1) that is neither hedonic nor purely instrumental. 
As already suggested, under such a reading it is hard to justify a con-
textual or relativist semantics, for this would mean endorsing some na-
ive form of speaker- or appraiser-subjectivism that many philosophers 
would consider problematic, and BPS deliver a more neutral analysis of 
corresponding types of value disagreement. Before turning to my own 
proposal, I therefore wish to briefl y discuss their approach. Since their 
articles address many issues in semantics and metaethics at once, only 
the central points can be repeated here.
First, BPS lay out what they call ‘canonical disputes’. Two persons 
A and B are in a canonical dispute if A’s utterance expresses some se-
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mantic ‘object’ p and B’s utterance another semantic object q such that 
p and q are fundamentally in confl ict with each other (Ibid.: 9, para-
phrased). By formulating their conditions in this general way, BPS al-
low canonical disputes on the basis of incompatible plans and desires, so 
their notion of disagreement is already broader (and, consequently, less 
revealing) than the ones laid out above. However, they still have similar 
worries as de Sá about relying solely on a semantic content-based defi -
nition of disagreement and therefore formulate the following criterion:
Disagreement Requires Confl ict in Content (DRCC): If two subjects A and B 
disagree with each other, then there are some objects p and q (propositions, 
plans, etc.) such that A accepts p and B accepts q, and p is such that the 
demands placed on a subject in virtue of accepting it are rationally incom-
patible with the demands placed on a subject in virtue of accepting q. (BPS 
2013: 11)11
They then argue that there are examples that intuitively count as dis-
agreements and fulfi ll DRCC, even though they are not canonical in the 
above sense, and conclude that ‘...theorists take a wrong turn as soon 
as they confl ate the question of whether a disagreement is genuine with 
the question of how the information on which a disagreement centers 
happens to be communicated.’ (ibid: 13) This paves the way for their 
thesis that many substantial disagreements about utterances involv-
ing evaluative expressions are metalinguistic in nature and that they 
are nevertheless worth having. Here are their main examples:12
(4) a. That chilly is spicy!
  b. No, it’s not spicy at all!
(5) a. Secretariat is an athlete.
  b. Secretariat is not an athlete.13
(6) a. Waterboarding is torture.
  b. Waterboarding is not torture.
(7) a. Lying with the aim of promoting human happiness is sometimes 
   morally right. In fact it often is!
  b. No, you are wrong. It is never morally right to lie in order to 
   promote human happiness.
(8) a. Tomato is a fruit.
  b. No, tomato is not a fruit.
According to BPS, all of the above dialogues are examples of metalin-
guistic negotiation. They concern the question of how to best use words 
11 This requirement fi xes defi ciencies of earlier defi nitions of disagreement based 
on attitudes that one person cannot hold jointly like in Egan (2010: 278). Cf. Marques 
(2014) for a critique of such defi nitions. I do not wish to enter this methodological 
debate here and consider DRCC a reasonable rule of thumb.
12 See (Plunkett and Sundell, 2013: 15, 16, 19, 20, 22).
13 Two sports reporters are discussing a horse in a race. One is calling it an 
athlete, whereas the others point is that only humans can be athletes. This example 
is originally from Ludlow (2008).
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in a given context and nevertheless may be important and substantive. 
BPS call the business of discussing and determining how we should use 
words or concepts ‘conceptual ethics’.14 For example, in a biology class 
(8–a) might be the appropriate position, whereas (8–b) may be more 
adequate for a chef. Likewise, there is no doubt that (6) is morally rel-
evant and a dispute worth having, even when underlying the dispute 
is, according to BPS, the fact that both discourse participants disagree 
about the meaning or adequate defi nition of ‘torture’. What constitutes 
the concept under discussion is important because of ‘...sociological 
facts about its sociological role’ (BPS 2013: 25), because there is some-
thing ‘...substantive at stake in how the relevant terms are used in the 
context [...] and the speakers recognize this fact.’ (ibid.) As they lay 
out, these disputes also survive paraphrasing, a test devised by Chalm-
ers (2011) to distinguish substantive from merely verbal disputes, so 
metalinguistic disagreement need not be merely verbal. That is, in a 
nutshell, their position.
To summarize, the problem is how to explain value disagreement in 
a way that does not make it a mere fi ghting about words and without 
stipulating a particular theory of value. Notwithstanding the possibil-
ity that many evaluative predicates are context-sensitive in some other 
ways—in fact, most of them are—, explaining examples like (1) and (6) 
in the contextualist way does not seem to make them cases of genuine 
disagreement. de Sá (2008, 2015) argues that this apparent defi cien-
cy can be fi xed by explaining the disagreement by different attitudes 
about pragmatically conveyed content. However, relativists are not 
satisfi ed with this solution, as the contextualist approach looks like an 
attempt to explain away the strong intuition that the discourse partici-
pants in such examples really do talk about the same subject matter. 
But the relativist position presupposes a type of appraiser-subjectivism 
that is even stronger than contextualism, and both positions seem im-
plausible as a general way of explaining examples like (1)–(8). They 
may be adequate for some expressions such as ‘tasty’ and ‘fun’ but seem 
to be unacceptable for other, broader value predicates like ‘brilliant’, 
‘right’, ‘is torture’ and readings of ‘good’ that are not purely hedonist or 
instrumental.15 The problem is that sometimes people might even dis-
agree fundamentally about the underlying value theory, for example in 
(7) the speaker might be a consequentialist and the hearer a Kantian. 
Following de Sá in the assessment that the discussion between con-
textualists and relativists was based on a too narrow semantic view 
14 See (ibid: 3) and Burgess (2013); Burgess and Plunkett (2013).
15 To avoid misunderstandings, it must be stressed that relativists generally 
do not deny this and also disagree among themselves about the question which 
expressions have a relativist semantics. In the same vein, it is also not claimed in the 
next section that a dual aspect semantics invariably means that no expression has 
a relativist semantics. Some might very well have a meaning that is best analyzed 
in relativist terms.
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of disagreement, BPS suggest that many cases of value disagreement 
are potentially important and worthwhile metalinguistic negotiations.
4. Two Faces of Meaning
This section consists of a negative and a positive part. In the negative 
part, I argue that the metalinguistic approach is not satisfying as an 
explanation of the value disputes under consideration. In the positive 
part, I sketch a dual aspect semantics that fi xes these shortcomings 
and can explain disagreement in a way that is content-based but nev-
ertheless remains compatible with the thesis that many value disputes 
are about the meaning of the expressions involved. This suggestion is 
then defended and motivated in more detail in Section 5.
4.1. Why Metalinguistic Negotiation Does Not Suffi ce
Overall, the metalinguistic approach has many merits, as it paints a 
more realistic picture of some value disputes than purely semantic no-
tions of disagreement. However, the problem is that it leaves the ques-
tion open of how to defi ne metalinguistic negotiation and it turns out at 
a closer look that it is very hard to make sense of this process. Accord-
ing to BPS, metalinguistic disagreement hinges on the idea that ‘...cer-
tain words (largely independent of which specifi c concept they express) 
fi ll specifi c and important functional roles in our practices[.]’ (Plunkett 
and Sundell, 2013: 20) This passage seems to suggest that the func-
tional role of the expression in question does not depend substantially 
on the concept it expresses, but is this really plausible? To me it is not, 
for it seems hard to fi nd a way in which a social practice with regards to 
a term may come into being without being based on a widely accepted 
meaning of that term, or in other words, because the term has that spe-
cifi c meaning and not another one. At other places, BPS explain that 
two discourse participants who disagree ‘...each advocate a view about 
which concept is best suited to play a certain functional role in thought 
and practice...’ (ibid.: 21), and so it seems that the disagreement is 
about the concepts again. Perhaps the question whether the disagree-
ment is about the use of the words or the concepts is not so important, 
because according to BPS both come as a package. Anna and Bob both 
try to advocate their concept in association with a given word, arguing 
that the respective concept better suits or fi ts the functional social role 
of past uses of the word. The problem with this suggestion is, however, 
that BPS do not provide a satisfying account of the ‘...social, historical, 
and psychological facts about what is standardly associated with the 
use of that term.’ (ibid.) To see why this is a problem, consider the fol-
lowing joking conversation:
(9) a. Anna: Work is torture.
  b. Bob: Indeed, it is.
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They are joking, but why? The correct answer is in my opinion that 
they both know that in modern democratic societies without slave labor 
camps work does not classify as torture, therefore Anna’s utterance is 
obviously false, and then a Gricean recovery strategy kicks in.16 This 
can only work if ‘torture’ has enough of a partial pre-established mean-
ing on the basis upon which Anna and Bob can agree that work does def-
initely not qualify as torture under normal circumstances, even if they 
disagree about other torture-related issues such as (6). For the dialogue 
to work as a joke, a pre-established meaning is responsible and not the 
fact that ‘is torture’ is not commonly used in a way that an utterance of 
‘Work is torture’ is accepted. Otherwise a value disagreement like (1) or 
(6) would boil down to an argument not about what constitutes torture, 
but about how people in the past used the word—but past utterances 
of (6–b) might not have existed at some point in time or they might 
have been made by people who clearly agreed all the time that (6–b) is 
false. So it seems that there is a pre-established meaning on the basis 
of which Anna and Bob forward their own views about torture, where 
one or both of them might deviate from this meaning, which past uses 
have expressed. If so, a dispute about past uses is in the essence a dis-
pute about this pre-established meaning. However, it seems woefully 
inadequate to reconstruct Anna’s and Bob’s dispute as being about the 
question whose defi nition of torture best fi ts this pre-established mean-
ing. That question should not be hard to answer and there ought not 
be much rational disagreement, because it is a purely factual matter. 
Either her suggestion fi ts or does not fi t the prior established meaning, 
and the disagreement would in the end be about a linguistic matter, 
whether other speakers in the community use the word ‘torture’ in a 
way that is compatible with, suggests, or even implies that waterboard-
ing is torture. There is nothing to negotiate then, they could just ask 
other speakers, so this cannot be the right approach either.
Perhaps it helps to understand the social functional role in a very 
broad sense and to assume that Anna and Bob disagree about a case 
that is not settled by prior uses. In this view, they seek to extend the 
meaning of ‘torture’ in a way that harmonizes with prior social prac-
tices concerning torture such as banning it, persecuting it as a crime, 
and so forth. However, this cannot be right either. Even if everybody 
had always agreed that there is no torture in some speaker community, 
it is hard to see how this fact alone could settle the question or even 
just play a substantial role in determining whether waterboarding is 
torture. Suppose Anna and Bob continue to discuss (6) and fi nally come 
to agree that waterboarding is torture. According to theory that BPS 
seem to suggest, Anna would essentially have convinced Bob of the 
fact that claiming that waterboarding is torture best suits our previous 
16 This is only an example. There are other explanations such as those given 
by Relevance Theory and nothing in what follows hinges on assuming the classical 
Gricean picture.
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practices of using ‘torture’ and reasonably fi ts with the already existing 
sociological functional role of the word. But if Anna and Bob negotiate 
in that way, they still do not settle the question whether waterboarding 
is torture! They could both agree that waterboarding is not torture and 
be wrong about it. How so, if they are just negotiating? It seems that 
the answer is this: They really argue about what constitutes torture 
in (6), about what makes socio-economic systems good or bad in (1), 
and about what’s morally right in (7), and in each case they argue on 
the basis of some already shared, pre-established meaning but without 
necessarily presuming that this meaning is correct or adequate.
This critique does not concern the metalinguistic aspect of the pro-
posal. Dialogues like (1)–(8) are metalinguistic in the sense that they 
concern the meaning of expressions involved, and it seems clear enough 
that these expressions are not used in the ordinary way in these dia-
logues. I fully agree with BPS about this observation. The critique chal-
lenges the view, however, that Anna and Bob negotiate the best or most 
appropriate use of a term. The thesis that in (6) Anna suggests to Bob 
that waterboarding should be called ‘torture’ because of existing prac-
tices associated with the word is not very convincing as a general ex-
planation of such disputes, because this would make her use of ‘torture’ 
a mere proxy or surrogate for something else. Instead, the correct in-
ference goes the opposite direction: Since the word expresses a certain 
concept, it is endowed with a certain social function, and another use of 
the word is endowed with the same (or a more specifi c) social function 
insofar as whatever it expresses falls under this concept. Hopefully, in 
Anna’s society torture is morally prohibited, illegal, and socially unac-
ceptable, and she may also use (6–a) to implicate or otherwise prag-
matically convey these facts with the intention of laying out to Bob that 
waterboarding should be illegal, socially unacceptable and prohibited. 
But even if she does so, a use of (6–a) to successfully convey this ad-
ditional speech act content can only be based on the prior meanings of 
the words in the utterance.17 If waterboarding is not torture in the fi rst 
place, as Bob believes, then how could (6) serve to indicate or even jus-
tify that waterboarding should be illegal? Alice’s reasoning chain must 
thus go in the following direction: Waterboarding is illegal, socially un-
acceptable, and so forth, because it really is torture, and what is con-
sidered torture in her society is considered illegal, unacceptable, and 
so forth. If that is the right direction of explanation, then the conun-
drum remains: If, on the one hand, that meaning is the pre-established 
meaning, then the dispute is factual, as laid out above. If, on the other 
hand, it is Anna’s meaning as opposed to Bob’s favorite defi nition, then 
the disagreement is once more direct and content-based, hence the two 
of them are talking past each other and the relativist critique applies.
17 Radical pragmatists and meaning eliminitavists would not subscribe to this 
view. These positions discard with truth-conditional semantics altogether and 
cannot be taken into consideration here for lack of space.
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Similar points can be made about the other examples. However, 
these considerations remain compatible with the view that metalin-
guistic negotation sometimes takes place in dialogues like (1)–(8), they 
merely indicate that BPS’s approach is not adequate as a general ex-
planation of these kinds of examples. Doubts remain about their use of 
the term ‘negotation’, which seems to be too weak for an explanation 
of at least some cases of important value disagreement, namely those 
in which the social function of an expression arises or is even consti-
tuted from its meaning. The role of negotiation in the metalinguistic 
approach needs to be motivated further. As it stands, there is a gap 
between the pre-established meaning of an expression and its social 
function. If the latter is determined or signifi cantly constituted by the 
former, then one of the disagreeing discourse participants may either 
be right by virtue of this meaning, if the new use is ‘covered’ by it, and 
the other will be wrong (or, both are wrong). This is a factual matter. 
The second possibility is that the new use is not covered by the prior 
meaning, as could be argued for the ‘athlete’ example (5), for instance, 
but then the extension of the new meaning is not covered by the social 
function either and the existing social function of the expression alone 
does not generally provide a reason for extending the prior meaning to 
the new use. BPS are right in calling the process of arguing for such 
an extension negotiation, as this process is oddly idle: The evaluative 
predicate has no power of its own, its existing truth-conditions barely 
matter, and it merely seems to act as a surrogate for attributing prop-
erties of the social function to the logical subject of an assertion. This 
is implausible. Although there may be exceptions to this rule, gener-
ally speaking linguistic expressions have a social role because of their 
meaning, not their meaning because of an existing social role.
None of the above implies that metalinguistic disagreement cannot 
sometimes occur, and BPS have argued convincingly that at least some 
such disagreements can be substantial and worth having. The follow-
ing dual aspect approach should therefore be taken as an addition to 
their account, as a way of making it more precise.
4.2. Core Meaning and Truth Conditions
To address the above mentioned shortcomings semantic theory itself 
needs be modifi ed. This makes the proposal more controversial, of 
course, but it also becomes more expressive and the modifi ed theory 
also explains many more phenomena than value disagreement. In the 
proposed dual aspect theory (DAT), every expression of a language has 
two meanings. The noumenal meaning of an expression contributes to 
the truth-conditions of a sentence as a whole in accordance with Witt-
genstein’s dictum. In contrast to this, the core meaning of an expres-
sion represents what I have so far called pre-established meaning.18 
18 There is an older use of ‘dual aspect theory’ in the philosophy of language, 
which is based on the idea of enriching meaning representations of sentences 
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This meaning is best understood by a loose bundle view, it represents 
the smallest common denominator between speakers of a given socio-
lect insofar as the meaning of the given expression is concerned, and 
speakers of a linguistic community have to agree to a large extent on 
this meaning for communication to succeed and in order to count as a 
competent speaker. Both meanings may be truth-conditional, because 
the attribute ‘truth-conditional’ marks a method of specifying certain 
aspects of meaning. Moreover, both types of meaning may be spelled 
out in contextualist terms in the way laid out above to deal with in-
dexicals and other forms of overt context-sensitivity, and this will be 
assumed from now on without further mention.
There is a third element that for lack of a better term shall be called 
noumenon. It is the (stipulated) object of an intentional stance of speak-
ers towards reality; noumenal meanings aim at the noumenon, they 
may pick out objects in reality like Fregean senses aim at the ‘Bedeu-
tung’, and sometimes reality also informs speakers to revise the nou-
menal meaning of an expression. Noumenal meaning is also a précis of 
the core meaning, whereas the core meaning is fi rst and foremost what 
is needed in everyday conversations. Core meaning evolves primarily 
out of a need to communicate and coordinate behavior, it may be con-
ventional in the sense of Lewis (1969) or may be more broadly conceived 
conventional in the sense of being based on non-inferential behavioral 
regularities between word and meaning. Noumenal meaning generally 
evolves out of core meaning when people start asking questions that 
aim at reality. For example, two speakers can talk about a lightning 
during a thunderstorm and agree that it needs to be avoided and that 
it is likely that fi re can be found where the lightning has struck. But 
they may also start asking themselves what a lightning really is. Is it 
a sign from the gods, some special form of fi re, an electromagnetic phe-
nomenon? These questions concern the noumenal meaning.
Core meaning is often incomplete and loose. For example, ‘freedom’ 
is an abstract noun that in everyday use stands for the possibility of 
making voluntary choices, an absence of oppression and unnecessary 
prohibitions, a lack of restrictions in thinking and acting, et cetera, but 
different speakers will only loosely agree on such features. In contrast 
to this, the scientifi c defi nition of an expression by an expert in the 
respective fi eld is a possible candidate for a noumenal meaning or an 
approximation thereof. Kant’s defi nition of ‘freedom’ is such a candi-
occurring in attitude ascriptions with additional features (guises, cognitive roles, 
ways of being given, Fregean senses, etc.) in order to explain cases of referential 
opacity. For example, Lois Lane might believe that Superman can fl y while at the 
same time consistently believing that Clark Kent cannot fl y, because Superman is 
given to her in cognition in a different way than Clark Kent. Core meaning does 
not fulfi ll this role, it serves the opposite goal of standing for the lowest common 
denominator and is therefore looser than noumenal meaning rather than more fi ne-
grained. The two theories have nothing particular in common. To combine them, a 
triple aspect theory would be needed.
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date, for example. Importantly, both meanings may be revised on the 
basis of a change to the other. The third element, the noumenon, is not 
a sort of meaning but something else in reality such as a mathematical 
fact, the orbit of the Earth around the sun, a particular family of cats, a 
building, or a person, if the noumenon exists at all. Since it is not a sort 
of meaning, the account is a dual rather than a triple aspect theory.
Before defending DAT in more detail, let us take a look at how it 
fares with the problematic examples. When two speakers disagree 
like in (1)–(8), they (mostly) agree about the core meaning and at the 
same time disagree about the noumenal meaning. They also intend the 
noumenal meaning to match some aspect of reality.19 So what they re-
ally disagree about is the question whether their respective candidate 
for a noumenal meaning is adequate with respect to the stipulated 
noumenon and can therefore be regarded as a précis of the imprecise 
everyday core meaning on which they both implicitly agree. If one of 
the discourse participants does not associate a core meaning with an 
expression that is suffi ciently similar to that of other members of the 
linguistic community, as they evidence from that speaker’s odd lin-
guistic behavior, then they will raise doubts about his competence as 
a speaker of the respective sociolect. Core meaning is linguistically 
mandated and the basis of a shared lexicon. For example, it is part of 
the core meaning of ‘torture’ that it involves infl icting serious harm 
(often though not always in an attempt to extract information), it is 
part of the core meaning of ‘athlete’ that an athlete is physically fi t un-
der normal circumstances, and so on. If Bob claimed that torture does 
not harm the person who is tortured, then he would not be considered 
a competent speaker with respect to ‘torture’ and Anna would react 
accordingly, perhaps by shaking her head in disbelief or by trying to 
educate him about the English language. In contrast to this, competent 
speakers may disagree about the noumenal meaning at any time, it 
is principally contestable and often hinges on complicated background 
theories which might turn out to be false. Disagreement about noume-
nal meaning is never about this meaning alone, though, which would 
lead to similar problems as those laid out for metalinguistic negotia-
tion in the previous section, but rather about the question whether this 
meaning adequately captures the respective aspect of reality it is in-
tended to capture—whether it correctly points to the noumenon.
From this perspective, the disagreement between Anna and Bob is 
metalinguistic insofar as it concerns an aspect of the meaning of ex-
pressions used, but it is also linguistic and a common form of disagree-
ment, because it is based on a mechanism that is completely normal 
for language users and occurs daily. Linguistic competence does not 
require convergence on noumenal meaning, on the contrary we often 
discuss it when we talk about general terms that are not grounded in 
19 Whenever intentions are mentioned in this article, they are to be understood in 
the philosophical sense that started with Brentano, not as intentions to act.
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empirical facts in any obvious way. In such discussions, expressions 
are not mentioned in the sense of being quoted, but the underlying con-
cepts are challenged by one or more discourse participants when they 
advocate some particular noumenal truth-conditions for the term. This 
may, but need not be an argument for or against a relativist or contex-
tualist semantics, as (3) and (4) might exemplify, because every aspect 
of the noumenal meaning is open for discussion. Some speaker might 
argue for the assessor-sensitivity of a given evaluative predicate, for 
example. A discussion may also amount to a mostly verbal dispute, as 
one might consider Ludlow’s ‘athlete’ example (5), for it is questionable 
whether there is something in reality that can decide whether horses 
can be athletes or not other than the existing core meaning or arbi-
trary conventions.20 In yet other cases such as (8) the dispute might be 
best characterized as a linguistic misunderstanding of confusing con-
textual standards, and this is also how BPS discuss this example. In a 
biology class the noumenal meaning is decisive, since biologists study 
plants and know criteria for classifying tomatoes that ordinary speak-
ers might not even have heard of. If Bob is not aware of this context and 
defends the core meaning, he is right, too, but in a sense that is often 
accompanied with a sigh. He is wrong in the same sense as a student in 
a philosophy class would be ill-advised to use ‘realist’ in the sense of ‘an 
uncomplicated and reasonable person, being down to earth’.
Some such cases might be confl icts between different sociolects, 
each equipped with its own noumenal and core meaning for a term, 
while others may concern the context of use, whether the word is used 
in an every day sense, or whether we are interested in what it really 
means. But this inaccuracy is not a defi ciency of DAT, it merely refl ects 
the reality of disagreements that everybody has experienced before. 
What is important for my thesis is that in clear cases of indirect value 
disagreement like (1), (6) and (7) the dispute will normally be about 
the noumenal meaning on the basis of the idea that something in real-
ity corresponds to this meaning and thereby justifi es it. Provided that 
both suggestions are suffi ciently compatible with the core meaning es-
tablished by the linguistic community, such a dispute will be merely 
verbal and insubstantial only if (a) competent speakers do not intend 
the noumenal meaning to ‘fi t’ the noumenon and (b) there is nothing in 
reality that would justify the meaning. Notice that error theorists de-
fend (b) but need not deny (a). As Meinong (1971) argued pervasively, 
having an intention in the sense of the Brentano School need not imply 
that the intentional object exists.21
20 Bear in mind that many disputes may also be about the core meaning; speakers 
are not always a hundred percent competent, the boundaries between sociolects can 
be vague, and it may be disputed which sociolect is relevant to the discussion.
21 I have laid out my own stance about nonexistent objects in Rast (2011). 
However, abstract objects are more complicated, see Zalta (1983) for a logically and 
philosophically developed approach.
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Regarding value disagreement, the theory explains how speakers 
may disagree about the meaning of expressions without talking past 
each other in the sense of direct contextualist disagreement and with-
out assuming a relativist stance that may only be adequate for select 
predicates of personal taste. Principle DRCC is fulfi lled, because the 
speakers disagree about the noumenal meaning of an expression on the 
basis of a given core meaning and and on the basis of their beliefs about 
the noumenon. The theory is therefore an extension of the metalin-
guistic approach, which on its own has problems with explaining why 
and what people are negotiating about the meaning of an expression. 
However, if this was the only merit of DAT, then the metalinguistic 
approach would perhaps be more desirable, since any unnecessary du-
plication of entities should be avoided by application of Occam’s Razor. 
As I will argue in the next section, DAT has many additional benefi ts 
and is nearly unavoidable for semantic externalists anyway.
5. In Defense of DAT
The dual aspect approach laid out in the previous section is not new. 
Similar suggestions have been made by semantic externalists and ‘an-
ti-individualists’ like Putnam (1975b) and Burge (1979, 1986) on the 
basis of insights from Kripke (1972). However, some care is needed to 
keep different aspects of externalism apart, since otherwise we would 
only win a pyrrhic victory. DAT aims at remaining compatible with 
weak semantic internalism by focusing on the social aspect of linguis-
tic labor division and allowing at the same time that two disagreeing 
parties may have different noumenal meanings in mind. In contrast 
to this, the strong externalism of Putnam (1975b) stipulates that a de-
scription of the extension constitutes part of the meaning of a term 
and that knowledge of this description or of the extension itself are 
not required by virtue of linguistic competence. The problem with this 
view is that it seems fairly implausible as a requirement for moral 
terms, because it presupposes an implausible form of moral realism, 
and this view would also be incompatible with more recent work in 
Putnam (2002). I will argue for a weaker form of externalism that ex-
plains metalinguistic disputes by the fact that speakers disagree about 
the noumenal meaning of expressions and in order to satisfy DRCC 
speakers must somehow be aware of these meanings in their minds in 
case of a genuine disagreement. This weak externalism for value terms 
remains compatible with the strong externalism of natural kind terms 
and nothing in what follows implies that strong externalism needs to 
be given up for those terms.
5.1. Arguments from Social Externalism
All of the arguments for semantic externalism cannot be repeated here 
for lack of space. However, I want to sketch two of them very briefl y in 
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order to carve out the distinction between weak and strong externalism 
I am aiming at. There are two types of arguments for semantic exter-
nalism. The fi rst one is based on Twin Earth scenarios, whereas the 
second one pertains to social labor division and is empirical. According 
to the empirical thesis, individual speakers of a natural language like 
English may generally be judged as competent speakers, even though 
they do not, according to the judgment of experts, ‘associate’ or ‘grasp’ 
the truth-conditional contribution of an expression to a sentence-in-use 
as a whole precisely enough.22 For example, speakers of English can use 
‘birch’ competently without being able to distinguish birches from elms, 
can use ‘water’ without knowing that it is H20, and can use ‘capitalism’ 
competently without implicitly knowing or being able to successfully 
apply a defi nition that would satisfy an economist. The empirical evi-
dence for social externalism is pervasive and there can hardly be any 
doubt that there is a linguistic labor division. We leave the question of 
what exactly certain expressions mean to experts and generally assume 
that these experts have a precise idea about what these expressions 
mean. Empirical arguments for social externalism are compatible with 
semantic internalism, though they certainly make it less appealing. An 
internalist could claim that at least some expert has to implicitly know 
the ‘right’ meaning of an expression in order for it to make sense at all; 
if that were not so, the internalist could argue, sentences containing 
such expressions might not be about any common subject matter at all.
Putnam’s Twin Earth argument closes this loophole. Suppose John 
on Earth has Twin John on Twin Earth as a counterpart who is mol-
ecule-to-molecule identical to John and also identical in his mental 
life with him, except that he lives on Twin Earth where XYZ replaces 
H2O.23 Putnam argues that even though they are in identical mental 
and physical states, in this scenario ‘water’ uttered by John on Earth 
refers to H2O, whereas ‘water’ uttered by Twin John on Twin Earth re-
fers to XYZ. Hence, the meaning of ‘water’ is not in their heads. Similar 
arguments can be made for other natural kinds like ‘tiger’ and ‘gold’. 
These arguments are clearly not empirical, since otherwise the exis-
tence of Twin Earth and XYZ would have to be established for the ar-
gument to be sound. Instead, they are thought to reveal the principally 
indexical nature of certain expressions: The extension of ‘water’ is fi xed 
indexically and possibly independent of our current state of knowledge. 
If the word is used on Earth, then it refers to H2O. If it is used on Twin 
Earth, then it refers to XYZ.
22 The scare quotes around ‘associate’ and ‘grasp’ are certainly adequate in 
this context. Ideally, much more would be said about these problematic metaphors 
but for lack of space this issue has to be suppressed. I will continue using the verb 
‘associate’, which may be taken to stand for a form of implicit knowledge or some 
ability.
23 It is sometimes argued that John and Twin John could not be identical, because 
the latter partly consists of XYZ instead of H2O. While technically correct, this 
argument leads astray and ultimately does not invalidate the thought experiment.
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Since it would be implausible to stipulate that speakers of a lan-
guage must know the correct extension of each term and this would 
also confl ict the empirical observation of social externalism, and since 
the idea that a systematic error-theory according to which speakers are 
generally not competent is equally unappealing, Putnam suggests to 
represent the meaning of general terms like ‘water’ or ‘tiger’ by a vector 
that contains semantic and syntactic markers such as ‘count noun’ and 
‘natural kind term’, the specifi cation of a stereotype that comes close to 
what I have called core meaning, and a description of the term’s exten-
sion, i.e., H2O for ‘water’ on Earth, but XYZ for ‘water’ on Twin Earth.24 
A competent speaker must only suffi ciently master the fi rst two items 
in a meaning vector, whereas the description of the extension is rel-
evant for the externalist determination of meaning that Twin Earth 
scenarios are supposed to establish.
Putnam’s position is very close to the proposed dual aspect theory. 
The core meaning may be taken as being comprised of the stereotype 
and semantic and syntactic markers, whereas what Putnam calls a ‘de-
scription of the extension’ corresponds to noumenal meaning. However, 
it differs from the current proposal with respect to the role of an exten-
sion (if there is one). Putnam (1994) meanders between different read-
ings of the third elements in his meaning vectors; he either takes it to 
be a description of the extension or as the extension itself.25 In contrast 
to this, I would like noumenal meaning to be more broadly understood 
as a refi ned meaning with which informed speakers come up when they 
are intending to narrow down and state more precisely a purported 
aspect of reality that is suggested by a preestablished core meaning 
and sometimes, though not always, also perceived or measured from ob-
serving nature. An important difference between these views is that in 
DAT the core meaning of predicates must enable the language user to 
identify entities falling under them—or, in case of non-empirical gen-
eral terms such as ‘triangle’ and ‘democracy’, to identify instances of 
the reifi ed abstract objects they express—in a suffi ciently precise way 
whenever the noumenal meaning is under discussion. This process of 
identifi cation need not be foolproof, but it needs to be precise enough 
to ensure that two people roughly talk about the same issue. Take ‘de-
mocracy’, for instance. While the concept of democracy is characterized 
to some extent by examples, I submit that it cannot be defi ned in a 
purely ostensive manner. But in order for two discourse participants 
to discuss democracy, according to DAT they need to roughly agree on 
relevant aspects of the core meaning prior to being able to successfully 
discuss the noumenal meaning, and this involves being able to tell a 
democratic from an obviously totalitarian society. This prior identifi ca-
24 See Putnam (1994: 252–255; 270–2), cf. Putnam (1975a: 148–152). Accounts 
of the nearness of semantic representations to each other and of individuals falling 
under them from a prototype have been made precise in geometrical meaning 
theories by Rosch (1975, 1983), Gärdenfors (2000) and others.
25 See Putnam (1994: 270–1).
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tion step is missing in Putnam’s stereotype theory and even explicitly 
denied as a requirement for empirical terms, but it is crucial for under-
standing value disputes. According to DAT two speakers are talking 
past each other and cannot disagree about the noumenal meaning in 
any fruitful way as long as they do not have at least a glimpse about 
the noumenon already.
5.2. The Peculiarities of Value Disagreement
Externalism only indirectly supports the explanation of value dis-
agreement that was tentatively outlined in the previous section. As 
BPS point out convincingly, it would be implausible to claim that ex-
perts generally fi x the meaning of value terms, as there is persistent 
disagreement among experts about the meaning of particular uses of 
‘good’ and other evaluative predicates.26 Some forms of goodness are 
almost purely factual, however, and for these social externalism seems 
plausible. To this category belong medical goodness (healthier than, 
better with respect to health) and varieties of instrumental goodness 
such as what constitutes a good hunting knife or a good telescope. For 
a given purpose, such questions can be answered by experts, and these 
notions of goodness are based on criteria upon which experts concur 
at least to some extent. It is doubtful, however, whether the question 
of what constitutes a good life can be answered authoritatively by an 
expert, there is no agreement between those experts, and there is even 
disagreement about who counts as an expert in this domain. Similar 
doubts are in place about moral goodness, since otherwise skeptical 
arguments like that of Mackie (1977) could not have gained traction. 
So social externalism is only plausible for some limited forms of instru-
mental goodness, and the claim that these constitute other forms of 
goodness can only be made from an already assumed perspective, for 
example from the perspective of consequentialist utilitarianism, and 
not in general.
An even bigger problem occurs when strong externalism of value 
terms is presumed. This position is inherently problematic for evalua-
tive language because it seems to presuppose value realism. Perhaps 
we point out instances of good things and actions, somehow access real 
values by these practices, and thereby defi ne what a particular read-
ing of ‘better than’ means, but regardless of how plausible one fi nds 
this theory, it remains just one of many possible explanations of the 
meaning of value terms. Lexical semantics cannot decide which moral 
theory is correct. Strong externalism works for empirical terms, be-
cause the assumption of metaphysical realism, the assumption that we 
all perceive the same actual world that is such-and-such, is philosophi-
cally acceptable to many if not most contemporary thinkers. Assuming 
a similarly strong realism for value terms is way more problematic. 
26 See Plunkett and Sundell (2013: 26–8).
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Firstly, it would exclude a variety of metaethical positions, and second-
ly, strong arguments have been devised against forms of value realism 
that are based on strong externalism.27
So there are tensions between arguments for semantic externalism 
and plausible views about the meaning of value terms. The support is 
indirect, since both types of arguments for externalism count in favor 
of DAT, which in turn explains the problematic cases of value disagree-
ment discussed in the previous section. In order to make this story 
convincing, though, more has to be said about the way in which DAT 
explains value disagreement. To see how DAT fares in comparison, 
consider the moral dispute in (6) again.
Why do the discourse participants continue to disagree at all, why 
can’t they just stipulate that waterboarding is torture1 but is not tor-
ture2 and happily agree with each other thereafter? According to the 
story of BPS, this is so, because of existing practices associated with 
‘torture’ that are morally relevant such as condemning it, making it 
illegal, and so forth. However, this story is incomplete, because the 
discourse participants could continue to discuss whether these prac-
tices should be associated with ‘torture1’ and ‘torture2’ respectively, and 
nothing of value, it seems, would have been lost by making this termi-
nological clarifi cation. Why would they need to negotiate one single use 
and meaning of ‘torture’? DAT answers this question and thus provides 
the missing link. The discourse participants are arguing about the nou-
menal meaning of ‘torture’, what really constitutes torture, on the basis 
of a prior partial agreement about a core meaning, which involves cri-
teria like causing substantial harm to the victims. They disagree about 
the right way of making these potentially incomplete and loose criteria 
precise. Should psychological harm be included? How much of it? What 
constitutes substantial harm? What do both moral and legal experts 
say about it? What do international humanitarian conventions and hu-
man rights say? These questions have been discussed for some time.28 
From the perspective of DAT, the speakers do not introduce mere defi -
nitions for different sets of criteria, because the noumenal meaning of 
27 Horgan and Timmons (1992) devise a Moral Twin Earth scenario. If on Earth 
‘good ’ has a consequentialist meaning and on Twin Earth it has a deontological 
meaning, then we would not say that ‘good’ on Twin Earth and ‘good’ on Earth have 
different meanings like in the case of water, but according to Horgan & Timmons we 
would say that earthlings and twin earthlings have different theories of goodness 
(and likewise for ‘right’). One need not share their intuitions and may also have 
doubts about the way they formulate semantic positions like Putnam’s, but in any 
case a strong externalist of moral terms has to address this argument. In contrast 
to this, from the perspective of DAT earthlings and twin earthlings simply disagree 
about noumenal meanings and there is nothing special about the scenario that 
would set it apart from other disagreements about value terms.
28 It may be argued convincingly, though, that the ‘pro-waterboarding’ side 
has always considered the practice torture and just fl at-out lies for the purpose of 
strategic maneuvering. So perhaps this is not the best example, but I’d like to stick 
with it because BPS use it.
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‘torture’ is intended to capture some aspect of reality just like the word 
‘electron’ does—social, human, legal and moral reality in the former 
case, physical reality in the latter.
The use of ‘good’ in (1) is slightly different than the waterboarding ex-
ample and indicates a feature that might be peculiar to value disagree-
ment. Suppose Anna has an understanding of ‘good’ in mind that could 
be paraphrased as ‘good for me and my business’, since she is a business 
owner and does not aim at comparing different conceptions of society. 
Suppose that Bob understands it differently as ‘good for society as a 
whole’ and happens to be a die-hard communist. The criteria they associ-
ate with the words could not be more different, yet Anna might actually 
agree with Bob about his assessment. She just has another reading of 
‘good’ in mind. The difference to the previous example is in this case that 
‘good’ and its more fundamental comparative counterpart ‘better than’ 
are also context-dependent and have many different noumenal mean-
ings as acceptable précis of the same underlying core meaning in differ-
ent contexts. So in addition to disagreement about a particular noume-
nal meaning, competent speakers may also disagree about the way in 
which a use of these predicates ought to be understood within a given 
conversational context even if they agree on the available readings. This 
might be a peculiarity of what I call aggregative value expressions to 
which ‘good’ belongs. These are multi-dimensional expressions that com-
bine various evaluative aspects of two or more items under discussion 
into an overall evaluation. Although I do not wish to make the case for 
this position here, I do believe that all genuine value expressions are ag-
gregative in this sense.29 In contrast to this, we could call ‘torture’ value-
laden, because the vast majority of mentally sane persons consider it to 
be bad, but at the same time might not consider it a value term itself. 
Perhaps this is the reason why we say that torture is bad but do not of-
ten explicitly state that being healthy is good or that being brave is good: 
The adjectives ‘healthy’ and ‘brave’ are themselves value terms that take 
part of an analysis of respective medical and instrumental varieties of 
goodness. If this is the right view, then we may expect candidates for the 
noumenal meaning of value terms to be fairly complex and subject to 
particularly long-lasting controversies. Pace Mackie (1977), widespread 
disagreement about value terms need not be explained as an inference 
to the best explanation that there is no noumenon. Maybe a better ex-
planation is that the disagreement is so persistent because value terms 
concern complex social matters whose evaluation requires considering a 
vast number of factors with potential trade-offs between them.
5.3. Core Meaning and Prescriptivism
In his famous book on evaluative language, Hare (1952) understood 
his universal prescriptivism as a corrected and expanded version of the 
much criticized Paradox of Analysis by Moore (1903):
29 Stojanovic (2015) sketches such a semantic approach. Pragmatic theories are 
briefl y addressed further below.
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Moore thought that he could prove that there were no such defi ning char-
acteristics for the word ‘good’ as used in morals. His argument has been as-
sailed since he compounded it; and it is certainly true that the formulation 
of it was at fault. But it seems to me that Moore’s argument was not merely 
plausible; it rests, albeit insecurely, upon a secure foundation; [...] Let us, 
therefore, try to restate Moore’s argument in a way which makes it clear 
why ‘naturalism’ is untenable[.] (Hare 1999: 83–4; Sec. II.5.4)
Among Hare’s arguments, the cannibals/missionary thought experi-
ment deserves special mention, not only because it is discussed by 
BPS and others, but for our purpose also in order to show why Hare’s 
preskriptivism and similar positions are fully compatible with DAT. 
He writes:
Let us suppose that a missionary, armed with a grammar book, lands on 
cannibal island. The vocabulary of his grammar book gives him the equiva-
lent, in the cannibals’ language, of the English word ‘good’. Let us suppose 
that, by queer coincidence, the word is ‘good’. And let us suppose, also, that 
it really is the equivalent—that is, as the Oxford English Dictionary puts 
it, ‘the most general adjective of commendation’ in their language. If the 
missionary has mastered his vocabulary, he can, so long as he uses the word 
evaluatively and not descriptivively, communicate with them about morals 
quite happily. They know that when he uses the word he is commending the 
person or object that he applies it to. The only thing they fi nd odd is that he 
applies it to such unexpected people, people who are meek and gentle and 
do not collect large quantities of scalps: whereas they themselves are accus-
tomed to commend people who are bold and burly and collect more scalps 
than the average. (Hare 1999: 148; Sec. II.9.4; orig. emph.)
This much-cited passage occurs late in the book after Hare has already 
made the case for the commendatory nature of value terms and sug-
gested to analyze them as sort of hidden imperatives. Its purpose is 
to illustrate why the descriptive meaning of value terms, whose exis-
tence Hare does not deny, are secondary to their evaluative use as tools 
of commendation. The missionary and the cannibals can understand 
each other, because they associate the same evaluative meaning with 
‘good’—that of general commendation—, even though they associate 
opposing descriptive criteria for what constitutes a ‘good person’ with 
the word.
From the perspective of DAT, such examples can be explained by 
stipulating that part of the core meaning of positive value terms like 
‘good’ is commendation, and part of the core meaning of negative val-
ue terms like ‘bad’ is the opposite of commendation, however one may 
call it. In everyday language we use positive value terms to commend 
things or persons with a certain respect. For example, healthy food is 
food that is commendable with respect to improving or maintaining 
one’s health and a good action is one that is commendable ‘all things 
considered’. From this point of view, competent speakers agree on this 
general component of the core meaning of value terms. If an honest 
and sincere speaker calls action A better than action B, all things con-
sidered, and still chooses action B or appraises B more than A, then 
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he lacks linguistic competence or makes a performative mistake. Even 
experts disagree, however, about what really makes an action com-
mendable—and the proposed criteria in my view constitute part of the 
noumenal meaning of the respective use of ‘better than’.
As appealing as this position might seem, I am reluctant to identify 
the core meaning of ‘good’ and related positive value terms entirely 
with commendation within a given domain. Hare himself restricts this 
analysis to moral uses of ‘good’, which he considers entirely different 
from other uses,30 and there may be everyday uses of evaluative adjec-
tives whose core meaning goes beyond mere commendation. Many as-
pects of goodness hinge on factual matters and at least in relatively ho-
mogeneous speaker communities people may agree on many readings 
of value terms way more than one might suspect at fi rst glance. For 
example, phrases like ‘a good hunting knife’ (instrumental goodness), 
‘a good holiday trip’ (hedonic goodness), and even ‘a good life’ (ethical 
goodness) may have core meanings that go beyond mere commendation 
and noumenal meanings upon which even non-experts converge upon 
sincere refl ection. Despite some disagreement on the details, there 
seems to be vast agreement on what constitutes a good hunting knife 
or makes a good holiday trip, and maybe also negative soft constraints 
take part of the core meaning: A knife with a lousy handle cannot be 
good, a trip on which both the hotel and the weather is horrible can-
not be good, and a life of stress, unhappiness and misery can hardly 
be called a good life. Since there is also reason for doubt that moral 
and non-moral uses can be distinguished clearly, even seemingly moral 
uses might be based on a fi xed set of fuzzy criteria within a speaker 
community. Is hedonic goodness a moral concept? For the Kantian, it 
is perhaps not, but for many classical utilitarians it is, and as long 
as we are not talking about what is really good in the hedonic sense, 
we may agree that being good in this sense means conforming to our 
subjective preferences and tastes, for instance, which vary from person 
to person. That being said, commendation always seems to be part of 
the core meaning of positive value terms, and their noumenal meaning 
may be understood as different attempts to fi nd criteria as to why the 
actions, objects, or persons that satisfy the core meaning are commend-
able—and from such an attempt it might very well follow that, judging 
from the proposed noumenal meaning, they are not commendable at 
all. So DAT can accommodate Hare’s prescriptivist intuitions while at 
the same time allowing for the possibility that other philosophical po-
sitions about evaluative language may also be correct, by making the 
commendatory aspect of value terms part of their core meaning and ex-
plaining some cases of indirect value disagreement among competent 
speakers as disagreement about what the respective expressions really 
mean, viz., about their noumenal meaning.
30 See Hare (1999: 140).
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5.4. Further Objections and Replies
Despite its merits there are some objections to DAT that I will address 
and attempt to defuse in the following paragraphs.
A rather obvious objection is based on Hare’s arguments and other 
variants of the Paradox of Analysis. In light of these arguments, does it 
even make sense to claim that value terms have a noumenal meaning? 
Would it not suffi ce to identify the evaluative meaning of value predi-
cates as some sort of hidden imperative, as Hare suggests? In my opin-
ion, this critique misses the point. Hare’s position and that of many 
other noncognitivists may be described as the view that value terms 
are not associated with any fi xed set of criteria into which they could be 
lexically decomposed, hence there might also be no defi ning character-
istics that would justify talking about a noumenal meaning. Instead, 
these theories explain, in various competing ways, their core mean-
ing by the ways these terms are connected with emotive responses, 
prescriptive uses, or their commendatory nature. But these are stand-
points in moral philosophy, and from the perspective of DAT these are 
fi ne and compatible with the more modest aim of DAT to explain cer-
tain cases of value disagreement that do not seem to be based on direct, 
content-based disagreement. Expressed in terms of DAT, noncognitiv-
ists argue that the noumenal meaning of some or all value terms is (a) 
not given by descriptive features of the noumenon alone, because there 
are none or we do not have suffi cient epistemic access to them, but by 
some features of the psychological or social role of those terms, or (b) 
that the noumenon of value terms consists of certain psychological or 
social facts that refl ect and explain the commendable nature of their 
core meaning. This standpoint is compatible with DAT, and a major 
selling point for DAT as a semantic theory is precisely the fact that it 
can explain value disagreements like (7) between two speakers who 
look at the same issue (the noumenon) from vastly different metaethi-
cal stances.
Another, perhaps more serious objection concerns the semantics/
pragmatics distinction and has also been raised from time to time 
against contextualist and relativist positions in the Philosophy of 
Language.31 The idea is to keep semantic representations minimal—
though not ‘crazy minimal’ (Recanati 2006) like in Cappelen and 
Lepore (2004)—and resort to pragmatic explanations for the rest. For 
example, Väyrynen (2013) defends a pragmatic approach to thick eval-
uative concepts like ‘lewd’. Would it not be better to bite the bullet and 
generally declare core meaning the ‘real’, primary meaning of expres-
sions and abandon noumenal meaning altogether? This amounts to ex-
plaining disagreements like (1)–(8) in purely pragmatic terms, similar 
to what de Sá (2008) has suggested for the relativists’ puzzles. It would 
go beyond the scope of this article to address this issue, especially since 
authors tend to presume their own semantics/pragmatics distinctions 
31 See for example the critique by Bach (2005) on Recanati (2004).
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and different answers can be given for different types of evaluative 
expressions. One powerful objection to a pragmatic approach, however, 
is worth mentioning in the current context: If noumenal meaning is 
generally explained in pragmatic terms, then this seems to amount 
to giving up truth-conditional semantics altogether, because the core 
meaning of many expressions is often semantically underdetermined 
and does not contribute enough to the truth-conditions of an utterance. 
Such a theory has undesirable consequences. Many expressions do 
make a precise truth-conditional contribution to the whole utterance 
in the form of noumenal meaning on which experts generally agree, 
even when experts do not completely agree or when their defi nitions 
are literally false or incomplete. For many purposes, the defi ciencies 
of natural language use can be ignored, since any good theory is by its 
very nature highly idealized. To give an example, taking half-integer 
spin as a defi ning characteristic of fermions and integer spin as a defi n-
ing characteristic of bozons might turn out to be inadequate in the fu-
ture, but is this an argument against the adequacy of these defi nitions 
now? I believe not. Such revisions often occur in science, for example 
the Ur-meter was replaced by a defi nition based on the speed of light 
and the defi nition of a second was changed from one based on solar 
days to one based on the radiation of cesium 133 atoms. Despite such 
differences in the detail, we can say that both defi nitions suffi ciently 
approximate the noumenon and are therefore adequate to a certain 
degree in many contexts of use. For example, a speaker who utters 
‘This doorway is 2.20 meter high’ may be said to fully understand the 
truth-conditional contribution of ‘meter’ in her utterance as long as she 
does not use it in a way that does not suffi ciently approximate a me-
ter. To make this clear, Wittgenstein’s dictum of the beginning of this 
article is false, since mastery of the noumenal meaning is not required 
on behalf of speaker competence and core meaning may be too impre-
cise or unspecifi c to yield defi nite truth-conditions. But we may still 
say that a speaker understands an utterance in a given context if the 
truth-conditional core meaning suffi ciently approximates the truth-
conditional noumenal meaning of the expressions involved in accor-
dance with the respective standards of precision that are in place in the 
given context. One might even go further and replace understanding 
with understanding to a certain degree, as long as it is kept in mind 
that for many purposes of coordinating behavior mastery of the noume-
nal meaning is not required. So there are two kinds of understanding 
in DAT. On the one hand, in successful communication a hearer may 
be said to fully understand an utterance without implicitly knowing its 
noumenal meaning. On the other hand, a speaker can be said to un-
derstand what a word or sentence in use really means when he or she 
grasps its noumenal meaning.32 Whenever experts mostly agree on it, 
32 Neither of these types of understanding is based on speaker meaning or speech 
act content.
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the noumenal meaning of an expression serves as a corrigendum of the 
core meaning; if noumenal meaning is discarded in this model, then the 
core meaning deteriorates into some vague notion of cognitive meaning 
suitable for many branches of linguistics but disconnected from truth-
conditions. This is a high price to pay. Why give up truth-conditional 
semantics entirely if a truth-conditional DAT can explain, at the same 
time, the directedness of everyday language towards truth and reality, 
its use as a convenient tool for co-operation of behavior for which truth 
may sometimes only play a minor role, and the vagueness of truth-
conditions of utterances in contexts of daily language use?
While I want to leave the exact nature of core meaning open for the 
time being, I have argued that it can be spelled out in terms of possibly 
semantically underdetermined truth-conditional meaning in a loose 
bundle view or the like, and noumenal meaning is truth-conditional 
just like Kaplan’s character. This means that both of them are based on 
lexical decomposition of word meaning, which unfortunately also comes 
at a price. Any such account of word meaning must somehow defend it-
self against arguments that are directed against analyticity. Many of 
those arguments such as the Paradox of Analysis itself are not particu-
larly convincing, and suffi cient doubt has been cast on them elsewhere, 
so this section shall end with only some admittedly cursory remarks 
about these sort of criticisms which can be raised against many more 
semantic theories than just DAT. The idea behind them is generally 
that the lexical decomposition of a value term G into multiple criteria 
C1,...,Cn or complex logical combinations of criteria is implausible as an 
account of lexical meaning, because it would make certain value judg-
ments analytical and this fact would fl y into the face of our intuitions. 
Note that without the last part there would be no problem and cri-
tiques rarely attempt to justify why our intuitions are worth a penny, 
but let us buy into this reasoning for the sake of the argument. One 
might reply to it that since Quine (1964) analyticity is often conceived 
as coming only to a certain degree rather than giving rise to analytic 
judgments with apodeictic certainty, and that DAT is compatible with 
this point of view because it states that (a) different speakers need only 
to associate similar core meanings with the same expression, (b) what 
the expression really means is often left to experts as part of a linguis-
tic labor division, and (c) defi ning characteristics of both types of mean-
ings may be false or otherwise not suitable, as long as there remains a 
way to identify the noumenon on the basis of those characteristics. For 
instance, although very unlikely, current chemistry might turn out to 
be incorrect and in need of revision because water turns out to be XYZ. 
Suppose it is XYZ. Then the noumenal meaning upon which experts 
unanimously agreed is inadequate, false, incoherent, or otherwise in 
need of revision due to changes in the underlying background theory. 
So analyticity is given the role that Quine reserved for it, not as a justi-
fi cation of infallible judgments, but as an explanation and indicator of 
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our willingness to give up certain claims about the meaning of expres-
sions easier than others. Both meanings in DAT remain in principle 
revisable, and whether or not such a revision leads to a retrospective 
language change, attributing the new meaning to speakers prior to the 
change, may hinge on various linguistic and social factors. The result-
ing post-Quinean revisable and fallible notion of analyticity takes the 
edge off the Paradox of Analysis and related worries. Although it may 
have been part of the noumenal and core meanings of ‘atom’ that they 
cannot be split, making ‘Atoms are the smallest, indivisible building 
blocks of nature’ analytic in this weak sense, we all know that this 
defi nition eventually went up in fl ames.
There is a related critique following Moore (1903) based on a posi-
tion that I wish to call ‘semantic primitivism’. In this view a use of 
‘good’ points to some primitive property of goodness, ‘democracy’ means 
democracy or the property of being a democratic state, ‘electron’ stands 
for the property of being an electron, and so forth. In support of their 
theory, primitivists resort to variants of the Paradox of Analysis, 
Moore’s Open Question Argument, and sometimes an allegedly vicious 
defi nitory circle.33
I do not have much to say about these kind of arguments except that 
I fi nd them fairly unconvincing. They contradict existing knowledge 
and are pragmatically incoherent with existing linguistic practices. We 
already believe that a democratic state is somehow defi ned by some 
of its characteristics, and we already believe that a ‘good knife’ must 
have certain features and lack certain misfeatures. A primitive, non-
decomposable concept theory also does not tell us anything useful about 
meaning and gives us no information about how to falsify statements 
containing the respective value expressions. That being said, it is worth 
emphasizing that DAT is compatible with the thesis that (a) certain ref-
erential expressions like proper names have no linguistically mandated 
core meaning—a speaker may associate a meaning with them, but need 
not do so by virtue of linguistic competence—, and the thesis that (b) the 
noumenal meaning of certain expressions such as natural kind terms is 
fallibly extracted from our investigations of the entities and ultimately 
fi xed indexically. However, I hope to have made it plausible that value 
terms and predicates to not generally work this way.
33 Moral intuitionists like Dancy (2004) seem to fi nd the circle argument 
appealing. Since you have to justify the conceptual analysis of the conceptual 
analysis, and so forth, at some point moral intuitions have to kick in. I fi nd the idea 
that you have to justify everything at any arbitrary level of semantic decomposition 
and the idea that intuitions could serve as a justifi cation equally unappealing, and 
in any case the same allegedly vicious circle can be applied to any lexical analysis 
of any expression, not just moral terms. The bottom line of my reply is that from a 
Platonic point of view the circle is not vicious and there is no need to start all of your 
justifi cations with the Big Bang. Justifi cation is a dialectic process that stops with 
agreement or in an aporetic stalemate.
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6. Summary and Conclusions
Competent speakers associate a core meaning with value terms, and 
it has been argued that the commendatory nature of value terms may 
be the best candidate for this common denominator among speakers. 
Speakers also generally strife to match, upon further refl ection, some 
fi tting aspect of reality with the use of such terms. Even for syncateg-
orematic expressions like ‘and’ various noumenal meanings have been 
suggested in the logical and semantic literature, and perhaps only few 
or none of them fully match the core meaning that may have evolved 
from our need to coordinate behavior by communicating with each oth-
er. When even logical expressions have controversial noumenal mean-
ings, then it ought not come as a surprise that there are many different 
candidates for the noumenal meaning of value terms. Perhaps we tend 
to not be satisfi ed with the core meanings of value terms despite per-
vasive disagreement about suggestions for their noumenal meaning, 
because that is generally the way language works. Once we transcend 
our needs of communicating for some immediate needs, become curi-
ous about aspects of reality that go beyond a mere need of coordinating 
with others, and want to describe reality correctly, we naturally assume 
that there is something in reality, the noumenon, to which the use of 
a term corresponds—which does, of course, not imply that there really 
is such a thing. On the basis of this thesis I submit that dialogues like 
(1)–(8) do not exemplify mere negotiations but rather attempts to bal-
ance noumenal meaning and core meaning in a way that approximates 
the noumenal meaning to a correct description of the often ephemeral 
and purported noumenon. If the noumenal defi nition deviates too much 
from the core meaning, then we obtain a technical defi nition that may 
appear to be arbitrary. If on the other hand the noumenal defi nition 
deviates too much from the noumenon, as for instance new evidence 
is acquired, then it is revised, which may in turn trigger a slower revi-
sion of the core meaning. So after all, disputes about value terms that 
are not directly content-based may not be so different from disputes 
about theoretical terms or terms for abstract objects for which an os-
tensive defi nition will not do either. They are peculiar because of the 
widespread disagreement about their noumenal meaning, but this may 
be the result of their often rather complex multi-dimensional compara-
tive structure and the complicated psychological and social phenomena 
with which they are connected. This approach is compatible with the 
metalinguistic negotiation thesis and should be understood as a précis 
and extension of it.
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